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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
; 000O000 
VICKIE BURROW, 
Plaintiff ar*d 
Appellant, 
Case No. 88-0098CA 
vs. 
MARK VRONTIKIS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
000O000 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide the 
appeal of this case pursuant to the provisions of Section 
78-2(a)-3(2)(g), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
This appeal is from the Order of Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
dated January 5, 1988, setting aside a Judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff previously entered by Judge Frederick on September 18, 
1984. Judge Frederick ruled that the plaintiff's claim for back 
support in a paternity action was barred by the doctrine of laches 
and/or equitable estoppel (Copies of the Order and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are included herein in the addendum.). 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL 
1. Whether the equitable doctrines of laches and/or 
equitable estoppel apply to the facts of this case. 
2. Whether the holding in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1987) is applicable to this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- STATUTES, RULES AND CASES 
1. Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a-l, et, seq. , Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) (A copy of the Act is included herein in 
the addendum*). 
2. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) (A copy of 
this case is included herein in the addendum.). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This is a paternity action brought by plaintiff against 
defendant pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, Section 
78-45a=l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. 2-5) 
2. Judgment was entered in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on September 18, 1984. 
The Judgment declared the defendant Mark Vrontikis to be the natural 
father of Chad Laverne Harney, son of the plaintiff Vickie Burrow. 
The Judgment also awarded the plaintiff a Judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $7,200.00, representing back child support 
from June 1, 1979 through May 31, 1983, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). (R. 165-167) 
3. In entering the Judgment, the Third District Court ruled 
that it was bound by the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978), that the equitable 
doctrine of laches was not applicable in a statutory action. (R. 
171) That ruling was subsequently overruled by the Utah Supreme 
-2-
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Court in the case of Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
(R. 249) 
4. The defendant appealed the decision of the Third 
District Court to the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 172) The Utah 
Supreme Court thereafter transferred this case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to the provisions of 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). ([Missing from Record]) The Utah Court of 
Appeals subsequently reversed and remanded the Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court on the basis of the Utah Supreme Court's 
ruling in Borland/ supra. (R. 247-251) The Third District Court 
thereafter held an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of 
whether the doctrine of laches applied to the facts of this case and 
thereafter entered its Findings of Fact and Order that the doctrine 
of laches barred plaintiff's claim for back child support. (R. 
253-258) Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal. (R. 259) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is the natural mother of a minor son Chad 
Laverne Harney, born August 17, 1976. (R. 179) 
2. Defendant is the natural father of plaintiff's child 
Chad Laverne Harney. (R. 177-178) 
3. When plaintiff informed defendant that she was pregnant 
in March 1976, he indicated that he was not able to make any 
committment to her. (R. 180, 270, T. 20) 
4. There was no further direct contact between the 
plaintiff and defendant prior to the filing of this action. (R 181, 
214, T. 21) 
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5. Plaintiff never made any direct representations to 
defendant concerning his obligations or her intentions. (T. 8, 9) 
6. Plaintiff never requested any third party to relay any 
representations to defendant concerning his obligations or her 
intentions, (T. 25, 26, 31, 32) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The equitable doctrines of laches and/or equitable 
estoppel are not applicable to the facts of this case. For these 
doctrines to apply requires some affirmative action on the part of 
the plaintiff more than mere silence. There is no evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's holding that there was more than 
mere silence. 
2. The trial court misapplied the holding in Borland v. 
Chandler, in that it deals with Section 78-45a-2 and not Section 
78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). In Borland, the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the possible prejudice to the defendant 
of plaintiff's delay in terms concerning defendant's ability to 
defend himself at trial. In the instant case, no assertion was made 
nor could one have been made that the defendant was prejudiced at 
trial by plaintiff's delay in bringing this action, because the 
defendant stipulated to the issue of paternity at trial. Section 
78-45a-3 clearly is intended to protect persons in the position of 
the defendant by limiting the father's liability to a period of four 
years. •i 
/ . . . . . , . . ; . , . 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES OF LACHES AND/OR EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has clearly ruled in the case 
of Borland v. Chandler, supra, that the equitable doctrines of 
laches and/or equitable estoppel can apply to a statutory paternity 
action. The doctrines are simply not applicable to the facts of 
this case. In the evidentiary hearing heard before Judge Frederick 
on December 7, 1987, both the plaintiff and defendant testified that 
no representations were made by the plaintiff to the defendant. The 
plaintiff testified that she did not make any agreements or promises 
to the defendant. (T. 7) The defendant testified that the 
plaintiff made no committment to him. (T. 20, 21) The defendant 
further testified that he knew the plaintiff did not want a third 
party to tell him anything. He testified as follows: "As a matter 
of fact, she did not even want him to tell me - - at one time I was 
with Bill and I could tell that he had some information that he so 
badly wanted to tell me, yet he was asked not to . . ." The third 
party, William Robert Snape, Jr., testified that the plaintiff did 
not ask him to relay any information or message to the defendant. 
(T. 35) 
In the case of Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), the 
Utah Supreme Court dealt with the issue of laches in a claim for 
accrued and unpaid alimony. The parties in that case were divorced 
in 1970 and in 1977 the plaintiff made a claim for unpaid alimony. 
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The trial court found for the defendant, ruling that the plaintiff 
was estopped by her silence from claiming the unpaid alimony. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In so doing, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Mere silence on the part of plaintifff is not 
sufficient to raise an estoppel, and we find nothing 
in the record to support the Court's finding that she 
had a duty to speak. In the case of French v. Johnson, 
16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965), this Court held: 
The facts show no representations either explicit 
or implicit, by plaintiff to defendant with respect 
to discontinuation of payments . . . Mere silence 
over a period of time will not raise an estoppel. 
(Citations omitted) 
The record does not show that plaintiff misled defendant 
in any way, nor that defendant changed his position to his 
detriment in reliance on any representations or actions on 
the part of plaintiff. 
In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the plaintiff 
never made any representations to the defendant concerning his 
obligations or her intentions* It is also uncontroverted that she 
never asked any third person to relay any representations concerning 
those matters. Apparently, a third person who knew of her stated 
intentions relayed these to the defendant. This does not rise to 
the level required by the Utah Supreme Court in Adams. In that 
decision, the court clearly contemplated some affirmative act on the 
part of the plaintiff and not mere conversation among friends that 
subsequently was relayed, without permission or request, to the 
defendant. Moreover, it is also uncontroverted that the only real 
information conveyed to the defendant was that the plaintiff said: 
"I'd like to tell the son of a bitch I don't want to see him ever 
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again." (T. 35) This is not the type of representation upon which 
the defendant is entitled to assume that he has no obligation for a 
child he has fathered* 
In the,case of Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), 
the plaintiff sought judgment against the defendant for nine years 
delinquent child support. The trial court found that the plaintiff 
had waived her right tof and was estopped to collect, the accrued 
child support, because she had concealed herself and the minor child 
from the defendant. The defendant had also been informed by third 
parties that he had no obligation of support. The Utah Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff. In so doing, the court stated as follows: 
The common element of the doctrines of waiver and 
estoppel is the requirement of action or conduct by the 
person against whom the doctrines are asserted. Such action 
or conduct is missing in the present case. 
The Utah Supreme Court made this statement even in the face 
of conduct on the part of the plaintiff in concealing herself and 
the minor child from the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that her 
concealment was a result of her fear of the defendant. The Supreme 
Court found that this concealment and the plaintiff's inaction in 
seeking the unpaid support ". . .does not unequivocally evince an 
intent to waive her right to the accrued child support." This is 
precisely the situation in the present case. The plaintiff's 
statement to a third party, gratuitously relayed to the defendant, 
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that she did not want to see the defendant/ does not unequivocally 
evince an intent to waive her right to support. 
Even in his self-serving testimony, the defendant 
acknowledges that at the time the plaintiff told him she was 
pregnant in March 1976, he was aware he could have been the father 
of the child. He subsequently stipulated to a finding of paternity 
without a trial on that issue. He also testified that he knew from 
third persons that the plaintiff had given birth to the child and he 
acknowledged that he could have located the plaintiff and the child 
had he attempted to do so. The defendant cannot be allowed to avoid 
a statutorily imposed support obligation merely due to the delay on 
the part of the plaintiff in bringing this action. By her delay, 
the plaintiff has been penalized for all of the support rendered by 
her from the child's birth in 1976 through 1979 due to the precise 
limitation imposed by Section 78-45a-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE HOLDING IN BORLAND V. 
CHANDLER. 
In Borland, supra, as set forth above, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel 
may be applicable in a statutory action. However, the discussion in 
Borland clearly centers on the potential prejudice to the defendant 
at trial due to the plaintiff's delay. In that case, the defendant 
argued that due to the plaintiff's delay, he was unable to contact 
witnesses and locate documents material to his defense. The court 
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found that the defendant had not in fact suffered any prejudice in 
being able to conduct his defense at trial. The holding of the 
Supreme Court in Borland clearly deals with Section 78-45a-2. There 
was absolutely no discussion concerning the possible application of 
laches to Section 78-45a-3. This is appropriate since the intent 
and effect of Section 78-45a-3 is to limit the defendant father's 
potential exposure for past due support. It is clearly designed to 
protect the defendant father from prolonged delay on the part of the 
plaintiff mother. To go further as the trial court has done and 
deny the plaintiff any recovery whatsoever for any past due support 
is to completely ignore the statutory duty imposed by Section 
78-45-3: "Every man shall support his child . . . " Due to the 
protective nature of the limitation in Section 78-45a-3, the 
defendant has already been excused from three years of support 
obligation for his son. To uphold the trial court's ruling and deny 
any obligation on the part of the defendant for past due support is 
to ignore the legislative intent in enacting Section 78-45a-3. This 
was not the intent of the Utah Supreme Court in Borland where the 
issue was clearly one of prejudice to the defendant at trial. No 
prejudice at trial in the instant case has been asserted nor could 
it be. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff believes the 
trial court erred in setting aside the judgment previously entered. 
The plaintiff respectfully urges this court to reverse the decision 
of the trial court and reinstate the judgment in her favor. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this fS* day of ^TL 
1988. 
U-^  t 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, Jr. 
—1UPW^5 L U - J I , 
Thomas N. Arnet t , J r S 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f arid 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Kristine Wimmer, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Thomas N. Arnett, 
Jr., attorney for plaintiff/appellant, Vickie Burrow, herein, that 
she served the attached Brief of Appellant upon the following 
parties by placing four true and correct copies thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Jerome H. Mooney 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
day of J\JJJ^ 1988. 
[Vi^a^w^ Uj' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me personally this IS' 
day of ~-JuL^ , 1988. 
Notary Public 
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for the Defendant 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5635 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICKIE BURROW, : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs • : 
: Civil No. C83-3916 
MARK VRONTIKIS, : 
: JUDGE: J- Dennis Frederick 
Defendant* : 
oooOooo---
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, this 7th day of December, 
1987, on remand from the Court of Appeals for consideration of 
the application of laches and estoppel to Plaintiff's claim for 
support for the period prior to the commencement of the action in 
this matter; Plaintiff appearing in person and through her 
attorney, Thomas No Arnett, Jr., and Defendant appearing in 
person and through his attorney, Jerome H. Mooney. The Court 
having reviewed the file in this matter and taken testimony now 
enters its Findinas of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
•vi) .') ijciS 
/ 
/v 
•f.r 
} ' / ' CZt. y>* :;.-•* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court notes that in the original trial in this 
matter conducted on the 13th day of August, 1984, that the Court 
expressed its concern with the inordinate delay of the Plaintiff 
in making her claim in this matter and for the impact of that 
delay on the Defendant. 
2. That said delay extended from March of 1976 when 
the parties met and discussed the condition of the Plaintiff 
until the Plaintiff filed the instant action in May of 1983 which 
was prompted by support requirements from her then current 
husband due to a then recent separation. 
3. That at the time of the original hearing this Court 
was bound by the Utah Supreme Court case of Zito v. Butler, which 
prohibited the application of laches in paternity actions. This 
case has now been overruled by the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Borland v. Chandler, which served as a basis for the reversal 
and remand in the instant case by the Court of Appeals with 
instructions to the application of laches and estoppel to the 
Plaintiff's claim. 
4. Plaintiff in the instant action engaged in an 
unreasonable delay in making claim. Delaying said . cisi.Tr for 
seven years. This delay additionally was Tore than just mer-3 
silence. Plaintiff made statements to a mutual friend of the 
parties which statements-she knew or should have known would be 
communicated to the Defendant and which were, in fact, Digitized by t e Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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communicated to the Defendant indicating that she wanted nothing 
further to do with the Defendant and the Defendant was to have no 
contact with her or the minor child. 
5. That the Defendant relied upon these 
representations which were relayed to him and that the 
Defendant's reliance was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances. 
6. That during the period of time after 1976 and prior 
to 1983, the Defendant entered into a marriage and incurred debts 
and obligations of his own. 
7. The failure of the Defendant to pay support for the 
minor child in this matter during the period of 1976 through 1983 
is a result of the actions and inducements of the Plaintiff. To 
enforce the obligation for this period against the Defendant 
would create an injustice. 
8. The obligation represented by the judgment in the 
amount of $7,200.00 for the period, prior to May, 1983, should be 
barred by the equitable doctrines of laches and/or equitable 
estoppel. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Equity should be applied in actions to prevent 
injustices including actions for claims in paternity. 
2. Claim of the Plaintiff for back support prior to 
the filing of the instant action should be and is barred by the 
doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel. 
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•# 
3c The judgment previously entered in the amount of 
$7,200900 for support prior to May of 1983 is set aside, 
day of 
Approved as to form: 
L 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f l f 
J . ^ENNIS J^EDHRICl 
D l s / t s a c t £ © u r t / J u d g e 
u ATTEST 
H^IXONHIVOIEY 
Clerk 
°epucy Clerk" 
DJJVRONT 
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JEROME H. MOONEY #2303 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for the Defendant 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5635 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VICKIE BURROW, : 
O R D E R 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
vs. : 
: Civil No. C83-3916 
MARK VRONTIKIS, : 
: JUDGE: J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
.The above-entitled action came on regularly for hearing 
on the 7th day of December, 1987. Plaintiff appearing in person 
and through her attorney, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., and Defendant 
'appearing in person and through his attorney, Jerome H. Mooney. 
The Court having heard the testimony of the parties, reviewed the 
file in the instant matter and heretofore made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now, therefore Orders as 
follows: 
J/:-ri . u iv:: 
-y £1 
ii 
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1. That portion of the original judgment outlined in 
Paragraph 6 in the amount of $7,200.00 is set aside. The balance 
of the previous judgment remains in full force and effect. 
DATED this i^ K^ day of Mk/ , 19 8/ 
Approved as to form: 
UgM/^c-5 L.Q-. 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR 
Attorney for Plaint By 
rS/FREDERICI 
ct^Ccuirt ' Judge 
/ 
ATTEST 
H.DWONHiNQLEY 
/ / Clark 
n 
Deputy CfcrK 
DJJVRONT 
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CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section 
78-45a-l. 
78-45.1 >. 
78-45a-3. 
78-45a-4. 
78-45a-5. 
78-45a-6. 
78-45a-7. 
78-45a-8. 
Obligations of the father. 
Enforcement. 
Limitation on recovery from the 
father. 
Limitations on recovery from fa-
ther's estate. 
Remedies. 
Time of trial. 
Authority for blood tests. 
Selection of experts. 
Section 
78-45a-9. 
78-45a-10. 
78-45a-ll. 
78-45a-12. 
78-45a-13. 
78-45a-14. 
78-45a-15. 
78-45a-16. 
78-45a-17. 
Compensation of expert witnesses. 
Effect of test results. 
Judgment. 
Security. 
Settlement agreements. 
Venue. 
Uniformity of interpretation. 
Short title. 
Operation of act. 
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father. 
The father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the 
same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child 
is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and con-
finement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the 
child. A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by 
a man other than her husband. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 1. Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
Cross-References. — Public support of chil- § 78-45-1 et seq. 
dren, Chapter 45b of this title. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
647 
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78-45a -2 JUDICIAL CODE 
. NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action to establish paternity. 
—Attorney fees. 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Right to trial by jury. 
Action to establish paternity. 
— Attorney fees. 
This act makes no provision for awarding at-
torney fees to the mother in an action to eatah-
UH\\ putarnily. Zito v. Butler, 584 R2d 868 
(Utah 1978). 
—Statute of limitations. 
Tolling. 
Any statute limiting the time within which a 
paternity action must be commenced under the 
Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled for all statu-
torily qualified plaintiffs during the period of 
the child's minority. Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 
P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981). 
Custody rights. 
—Acknowledgment of paternity. 
Father who publicly acknowledged his pater-
nity had right to custody of his illegitimate 
child, second only to mother's right, so that it 
was improper for juvenile court to dismiss peti-
tion for custody and thereby terminate father's 
parental right without hearing to determine 
whether he was fit and proper person. State ex 
rel. Baby Girl M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 
1013, 45 A.L.R.3d 206 (1970). 
Right to trial by jury. 
Since there is no inherent constitutional 
right to a trial by jury in paternity proceedings 
in this state and the Legislature has not pro-
vided for such a right by statute, the defen-
dant, a putative father, had no right to a trial 
by jury. Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Nordgren v„ Mitchell: 
Indigent Paternity Defendants' Right to Coun-
sel, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 933. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 68. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 18. 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of puta-
tive father's promise to support or provide for 
illegitimate child, 20 A.L.R.3d 500. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «*=» 
21. 
78-45a-2. Enforcement. 
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, or the 
public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child. If paternity 
has been determined or has been acknowledged according to the laws of this 
state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same or other pro-
ceedings 
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority which have furnished 
or may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses, and 
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78 -45a -2 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2. 
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-
sions by Department of Social Services, 
§ 55-15a-24. 
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties 
of Department of Social Services in collecting 
child support, § 55-15c-4. 
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of 
this title. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Estoppel and laches. 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Right to counsel. 
—Indigent prisoners. 
——Blood tests. 
Discretion of court. 
Standard of proof. 
— -Preponderance of evidence. 
Estoppel and laches. 
Under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v„ 
Chandler, No. 19066 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 
4, 1987). 
A paternity action brought six years after 
the birth of the child was not barred by laches, 
where defendant made no factual showing to 
support his argument that he was prejudiced 
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, No. 19066 
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1987). 
Evidence. 
—Conception and birth. 
Where child was conceived while mother was 
married to her first husband and born while 
she was married to her second husband, the 
child was legitimate whichever husband was 
the father, and testimony by mother that dis-
puted second husband's fatherhood and sup-
ported first husband's fatherhood would not 
illegitimize the child and was properly admis-
sible in paternity action against first husband. 
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982). 
Right to counseL 
—Indigent prisoners. 
Blood tests. 
While due process does not require Utah to 
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who 
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be 
some complicated paternity suits in which the 
risks of error would be high enough that the 
presumption against the right to appointed 
counsel would be overcome; given the avail-
ability and quality of the blood tests, there is 
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the 
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Discretion of court. 
Due process of law does not require that all 
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity 
actions must always be appointed counsel; 
whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discre-
tion of the trial court. Nordgren v. Mitchell, 
524 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), affd, 716 F.2d 
1335 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Standard of proof. 
—Preponderance of evidence. 
The applicable standard of proof where pa-
ternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of 
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note, 
Wiese v. Wiese: Support Obligations of Step-
parents—The Utah Supreme Court Toppled by 
Estoppel, 12 J. Contemp. L. 305 (1987). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards 
§ 74 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 32 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action for determination of paternity 
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Statute of limitations in illegitimacy or bas-
tardy proceedings, 59 A.L.R.3d 685. 
Key NumberSo — Illegitimate children «=» 
30 et seq. 
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78-45a-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45a-3. Limitation on recovery from the father. 
The father's liability for past education and necessary support are limited to 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 3. for support or maintenance of dependent chil-
Cross-References. — Limitation of action dren, § 78-12-22, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Statute of limitations. for all statutorily qualified plaintiffs during 
the child's minority, the amount of recovery of 
M?U f11 '^ x * i. i- •*• ..
 A- -M. child support is still limited by this section. 
While any statute limiting the time within
 c i o i i coc n OJ moo /TT*. U 
. . . ; * , , Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
which a paternity action must be commenced IQQI> 
under the Uniform Act on Paternity is tolled 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=> 
§ 127. 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
78-45a-4. Limitations on recovery from father's estate* 
The obligation of the estate of the father for liabilities under this act are 
limited to amounts accrued prior to his death and such sums as may be pay-
able for dependency under other laws. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 4. 1965, Chapter 158, which appears as 
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this §§ 78-45a-l to 78-45a-17. 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws Cross-References. — Civil liability for sup-
port, Chapter 45 of this title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. —- Illegitimate children <*=> 
§ Vil. 35. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 53. 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all 
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and 
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses 
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All reme-
dies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available 
for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Social Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or in 
its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to enforce 
that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, 
all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable to this 
chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-7 
Social Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the county 
attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that depart-
ment. 
History? L. 1965, ch. 158, § 5; 1975, ch. 96, last sentence in Subsection (1), appears as 
§ 24. Chapter 31 of Title 77. 
Meaning of "this act", — See note under Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. m e n t o f S o c i a l Services, § 63-35-3. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of General duties of attorney general, § 67-5-1. 
Support Act - The Uniform Reciprocal En- • General duties of county attorney, § 17-18=1. 
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the
 £ general jurisdiction of district court, 
§ 78-3-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Jurisdiction. form Act on Paternity, when the putative fa-
ther is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't 
-Minority of putative father.
 o f S o d u l S e r V 8 v D i c k 6 8 4 p 2 d 4 2 { U t a h 
District court, and not the juvenile court, has 1904) 
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uni-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jure 2d. — 10 Am. Jur, 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <^  
§ 126 et seq. 69 to 71. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 116, 117. 
78-45a-6. Time of trial. 
If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the pregnancy 
of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be 
held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such delay testimony may 
be perpetuated according to the laws of this state. 
History; L. 1965, ch. 158, § 6. 
Cross-References. -— Depositions before ac-
tion, Rule 27 UUCP. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
§ 123. 55. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 101. 
78-45a-7, Authority for blood tests. 
The court, upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf 
of any person whose blood is involved may, or upon motion of any party to the 
action made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, shall order 
the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party 
refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity 
against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests 
of justice so require. 
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78-45a-8 JUDICIAL CODE 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 7. Unreasonable searches, Utah Const., Art, I, 
Cross-References. — Blood tests to deter- Sec. 14. 
mine parentage, §§ 78-25-18 to 78-25-23. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
§ 118. 45. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
78-45a-8. Selection of experts. 
The tests shall be made by experts qualified as examiners of blood types 
who shall be appointed by the court. The experts shall be called by the court 
as witnesses to testify to their findings and shall be subject to cross-examina-
tion by the parties. Any party or person at whose suggestion the tests have 
been ordered may demand that other experts, qualified as examiners of blood 
types, perform independent tests under order of court, the results of which 
may be offered in evidence. The number and qualifications of such experts 
shall be determined by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 8. Court appointment of expert witnesses, Rule 
Cross-Ueferences. — Blood test examiner 706, U.R.E. 
as witness, § 78-25-20. 
78-45a-9. Compensation of expert witnesses. 
The compensation of each expert witness appointed by the court shall be 
fixed at a reasonable amount. It shall be paid as the court shall order. The 
court may order that it be paid by the parties in such proportions and at such 
times as it shall prescribe. The fee of an expert witness called by a party but 
not appointed by the court shall be paid by the party calling him but shall not 
be taxed as costs in the action. 
History: L. 11)65, ch. 158, 8 9. 
Cross-References. — Judgment and costs, 
Rule 54, U U C P . 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 138. 
Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
75. 
78-45a-10. Effect of test results. 
If the court finds that the conclusions of all experts, as disclosed by the 
evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of 
the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the ex-
perts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be submitted 
upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the 
possibility of the alleged father's paternity, admission of this evidence is 
within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood 
type. 
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-12 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 10. 
Cross-References. — Admissibility of blood 
test results, § 78-25-21. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Admissibility, tific evidence; such test results were not admit-
. _ . ted as evidence where the party submitting the 
- H u m a n leukocyte antigen. test results failed to establish an adequate 
This section does not preclude the admissi.
 f o u n d a t i o n a t t r i a i f o r t h e i r admissibility. Phil-
bihty of human leukocyfe antigen (HLA) test ,. ,
 TT. , c . . ~ ,. ~ c • , c 
,. .r , . . ., . ., , lips ex reL Utah State Dep t of Social Servs. v. 
results if such test otherwise meets the rele-
 T
r
 .
 C1_ n OJ 1 0 0 Q ;TT. . 1 f t o m 
vant legal standards for the admission of scien- J a c k s o n ' 6 1 5 R 2 d 1 2 2 8 ( U t a h 1 9 8 0 ) -
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «= 
§ 107. 53. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 93. 
78-45a-ll. Judgment. 
Judgments under this act may be for periodic payments which may vary in 
amounto The court may order payments to be made to the mother or to some 
person, corporation, or agency designated to administer them under the super-
vision of the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 11. Cross-References. — Child support collec-
Meaning of "this act". — See note under tion, Chapter 45d of this title, 
same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children «=» 
§ 127. 67. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 111. 
78-45a-I2. Security. 
The court may require the alleged father to give bond or other security for 
the payment of the judgment. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 12. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate children <*» 
§ 128. 70. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Busturds S 118 et «eq. 
653 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78-45a-13 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45a-13. Settlement agreements. 
An agreement of settlement with the alleged father is binding only when 
approved by the court. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children «=» 
§ 98 et seq. 33. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 40 et seq. 
78-45a-14. Venue. 
An action under this act may be brought in the county where the alleged 
father is present or has property or in the county where the mother resides. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 14. Cross-References. — Venue, general provi-
Meaning of "this act". — See note under sions, Chapter 13 of this title. 
same cutchline following § 78-45a-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards Key Numbers. — Illegitimate Children *=» 
§ 76. 37. 
C.J.S. — 10 C.J.S. Bastards §§ 57, 58. 
78-45a-15. Uniformity of interpretation. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, 8 15. Cross-References. — Construction of stat-
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of utes, Chapter 3 of Title 68. 
"(t|his act," referred to in this section, see note 
under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
78-45a-16. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Act on Pater-
nity." 
History; L. 1965, ch. 158, { 16. "[tlhis act," referred to in this section, see note 
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of under same catchline following § 78-45a-4. 
78-45a-17. Operation of act. 
This act applies to all cases of birth out of wedlock as defined in this act 
where birth occurs after this act takes effect. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 17. see note under same catchline following 
Meaning of "this act". — As to meaning of § 78-45a-4. 
"[tlhis act," referred to throughout this section, "This act takes effect". The term "this act 
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PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 78-45b-l 
takes effect," referred to in this section, means 
the effective date of Laws 1965, Chapter 158, 
i.e., May 11, 1965. 
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14 51 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Cod. •Co Prw, Via* 
its response until three weeks after it was due. 
With knowledge that the notice was forthco-
ming and a response was necessary, the 
employer's neglect or mistake was not excus-
able. Cf. Katz v. Pierce, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 
12 (Sept. 12, 1986). The Department's refusal 
to consider it was reasonable and rational 
under sections 35-4-7 and 35-4-10. 
We find the arguments on appeal to be 
without merit, and the decision of the Board 
of Review is affirmed. 
Howe, Justice, concurs in the result. 
1. §35-4-7(c)(3)(E); all statutory citations 
herein arc to U.C.A., 1953 (1974 ed., Supp. 
1986). 
2. §35-4-10(i); Utah Department of 
Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 608-09 (Utah 
1983). 
3. Section 35-4-7(c)(3)(E) provides, in 
part: 
Any employing unit that receives a 
notice of the filing of a claim may 
protest payment of benefits to former 
employees or charges to the employer 
if the protest is filed within ten days 
after the date the notice is issued. 
4. See Kirkwood v. Department of Emplo-
yment Security, 709 P.2d 1158, (Utah 1985); 
Wood v. Department of Employment Secu-
rity, 680 P.2d 38 (Utah 1984); Thiessens v. 
Department of Employment Security, 663 
P.2d 72 (Utah 1983). 
5. Airkem v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 
P.2d 429 (1973). 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
ATTORNEYS: 
David E. Yocom, Sandy Mooy, David L. 
Wilkinson for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
Randall Gaither for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant Raymond Chandler appeals 
from a jury verdict finding him to be the 
father of a child of plaintiff Kathy Borland. 
The jury also awarded Kathy Borland and the 
State Department of Social Services damages 
for support of the minor child. Chandler 
asserts that the trial court erred in allowing 
the child to be exhibited to the jury so that it 
might determine whether the child resembled 
him. He also argues that the action was 
barred by laches. We hold that the action was 
not barred by laches, but reverse and remand 
because an inadequate foundation was laid 
for allowing the jury to see the child in 
person. 
Beginning in January or February of 1973, 
Chandler and Kathy Borland began dating. 
They saw each other for several months and 
regularly had sexual intercourse. In the late 
summer or early fall of 1973, Chandler left 
Utah to work on a construction site in Rock 
Springs, Wyoming. Borland discovered she 
was pregnant in October of 1973. On June 8, 
1974, Borland bore the child whose paternity 
is at issue here. 
This action was begun by Borland and the 
Utah State Department of Social Services in 
1980. Trial was held in 1983, at which time 
Borland testified that she had sexual interco-
urse with Chandler when he returned to Utah 
from Rock Springs, Wyoming, on weekends 
during August and September of 1973. She 
also testified that she did not have sexual 
intercourse with men other than Chandler 
from June of 1973 until the birth of the child. 
Borland testified that after she informed 
Chandler of her pregnancy, he offered at 
various times to pay for an abortion, marry 
her, support her and the child, and at one 
time offered her $100 to tell the State that he 
was not the father. Borland also asserted that 
Chandler acknowledged his paternity when he 
visited her at Christmas in 1974. Borland's 
mother testified that Chandler told her that 
he had offered to marry Borland. Results of 
an HLA test established that Chandler was 
not excluded as a possible biological father of 
the child. 
Chandler testified that although he retu-
rned to Utah upon occasion after moving to 
Rock Springs, he did not have sexual interc-
ourse with Borland after July of 1973. He 
denied having offered to pay for an abortion 
or to marry Borland. One witness testifying 
on Chandler's behalf stated that he had seen 
Borland with a number of other male comp-
anions in September and October of 1973, 
after Chandler left Utah. 
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At the beginning of the trial, Chandler 
sought an order prohibiting the child's exhi^  
bition. Thfe motion was argued at length. The 
State's attorney represented to the court that 
the child would be exhibited only while 
Borland pointed out specific physical simila-
rities between Chandler and the child. The 
court then dismissed Chandler's motion0 
During trial9 the child was allowed in the 
courtroom for about five minutes during 
which time his mother identified him. No 
testimony was introduced relating to specific 
resemblances between Chandler and the 
child. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
returned a verdict against Chandler. This 
appeal followed. 
Chandler first argues that the child should 
not have been exhibited to the jury. He urges 
this Court to adopt the rule of Almeida v. 
Correa, 51 Hawaii 594, 465 P.2d 564 (1970). 
There, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that 
the exhibition of a child to establish resembl-
ance was improper and that only expert evid-
ence relating to specific resemblances would 
be admissible. Id. at 571. If the Almeida rule 
is not adopted, Chandler contends that the 
exhibition of the child was nonetheless impr-
oper under the standard set forth in State v. 
Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442 (1924), in 
which this Court approved the trial court's 
admission of independent evidence as to 
"specific resemblances of the child to the 
putative father, and thereafter permitted the 
child to be exhibited to the jury as evidence." 
63 Utah at 174-75,224 P. at 443. 
The rules governing the exhibition of a 
child to establish paternity vary widely from 
one jurisdiction to another Some prohibit 
exhibition altogether, while others allow a 
child of any age to be exhibited. See generally 
Annot., 55 A.L.RJd 1087 (1974). The 
Hawaii Supreme Court's Almeida rule flatly 
prohibiting exhibition is based upon that 
court's finding, drawn from the current liter-
ature, that "the link between parent and child 
can be discerned only in ... very specific inst-
ances and not by evidence of general resemb-
lance or by a comparison of individual feat-
ures." 465 P.2d at 569. The Hawaii court 
concluded as follows: 
The identification of a physical char-
acteristic, whether that characteristic 
is in fact hereditary, what other 
factors may have helped shape it, and 
how the characteristic in question is 
linked to a similar characteristic 
possessed by the alleged parent are all 
questions for experts.... 
Id. at 570. While the Almeida rule has been 
followed in a few states, see, e.g., People in 
•re R.D.S., 183 Colo. 89, 514 P.2d 772, 774 
(1973); cf. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 389 
Mass. 308, 450 N.E.2d 167 (1983), it has not 
been widely accepted. See State v. Mesquita, 
17 Ariz. App. 151, 496 P.2d 141, 143 (1972); 
Glascock v. Anderson, 83 N.M. 725, 497 
P.2d 727, 728-29 (1972). Although the scien-
tific data currently available provides support 
for the ruling in Almeida, we are not persu-
aded that this evidence is sufficiently unani-
mous to justify a departure from the Anders-
on standard. Cfe State v. Long, 721 P,2d 483 
(Utah 1986). In our view, the relatively caut-
ious approach of Anderson to child exhibi-
tion strikes a sound middle ground between 
prohibiting exhibition of a child altogether 
and allowing exhibition regardless of age or 
other indicia of reliability, and the Anderson 
standard provides sufficient safeguards to 
protect against gross speculation on the part 
of the jury. 
The issue, then, is whether the trial court 
properly allowed the child to be exhibited to 
the jury under Anderson. We conclude that it 
did not. There is no indication in the record 
that the trial court found that the child had 
the necessary "settled features." State v. 
Anderson, 63 Utah at 174, 224 P. at 443. 
More critically, no evidence regarding specific 
resemblances between Chandler and the child 
was introduced prior to the child's exhibition 
or even while the child was in front of the 
jury. Id. Under these circumstances, the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing exhib-
ition of the child. Aside from this resembl-
ance evidence, the case turned solely upon the 
credibility of Borland, Chandler, and their 
respective witnesses. Because of the paucity 
of other evidence, we cannot predict how the 
jury would have decided the matter absent 
this error. Therefore, the case must be reve-
rsed and remanded for a new trial. 
Chandler next argues that a new trial 
would be improper because the paternity 
action, instituted seven years after the child's 
birth, is barred by laches. He asserts that the 
State's failure to prosecute the action in a 
more timely fashion was prejudicial because 
the lapse of time has prevented him from 
gathering and producing documents and 
witnesses essential to his defense. The State 
and Borland, relying upon Zito v. Butler, 584 
P.2d 868 (Utah 1978), argue that laches has 
no application to an action created by 
statute. While we conclude that laches may 
apply to a statutory action, the facts in the 
present case are not sufficient to invoke it. 
The principle relied upon by the plaintiffs 
here has its roots in the common law distinc-
tion between law and equity. At common 
law, an equitable defense could not be raised 
to a legal action, and because a statutory 
action was legal in nature, equitable defenses 
would not apply. See 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
§154 (1966). This seems to be the theory 
behind Zito, a per curiam opinion. However, 
Utah long ago abolished any formal distinc-
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tion between law and equity. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 2. It is well established that equitable 
defenses may be applied in actions at law and 
that principles of equity apply wherever 
necessary to prevent injustice. Hilton v. 
Sloan, 37 Utah 359, 374-75, 108 P. 689, 694-
95 (1910); see generally Marlowe Investment 
Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 
1402 (1971); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976). Therefore, it is clear 
that under appropriate circumstances, laches 
may bar an action for paternity. Even the 
majority opinion in Nielsen ex rel. Depart-
ment of Social Services v. Hansen, 564 P.2d 
1113, 1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito, recog-
nizes in dictum that laches might apply in a 
paternity action. Therefore, we conclude that 
to the extent that Zito stands for the propos-
ition that an equitable defense is not avail-
able, it is an incorrect statement of the law 
and is overruled. * 
To successfully assert a laches defense, a 
defendant must establish both that the plain-
tiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an 
action and that the defendant was prejudiced 
by that delay. Papanikolas Brothers Enterpr-
ises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associa-
tes, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). In this 
case, Chandler asserts that because of the 
time lapse, he was unable to contact witnesses 
material to his defense and was unable to 
locate time cards which would have establi-
shed that he did not travel from Rock Springs 
to Salt Lake City every weekend. Argument 
alone is insufficient to persuade us that 
Chandler was prejudiced, and he had made 
no factual showing to support the argument. 
Chandler did not establish that he attempted 
and was unable to contact witnesses. More-
over, he had access to company records prior 
to trial, and his supervisor testified on his 
behalf at trial. There is nothing to indicate 
that the testimony equivalent to the evidence 
established by the time cards could not have 
come in through the supervisor. In addition, 
Chandler conceded that he returned to Utah 
upon occasion in the fall of 1983; therefore, 
the introduction of time cards to show that 
he did not return every weekend would not 
have materially assisted in his defense. Under 
the circumstances, no prejudice is apparent 
and further prosecution is not barred by 
laches. See Doe v. Roe, 705 P.2d 535, 541 
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1985). 
Reversed and remanded. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
, Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
!
. Zito's analysis of the legal principles 
applicable to the time within which a 
paternity action must be instituted is weak. A 
better reasoned and more recent statement of 
the law may be found in Szarak v. Sandoval, 
636 P.2d 1082, 1084-85 (Utah 1981). 
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HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff brought this quiet title action to 
settle a dispute over real property located in 
Hurricane, Utah. 
I 
A trial was had in this case on February 1, 
2, and 3, 1983, before an advisory jury. The 
case was submitted on special interrogatories 
which the jury returned in favor of plaintiff. 
The trial court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which generally confo-
rmed to the pleadings and incorporated the 
substance of the jury's answers to the special 
interrogatories.. Those findings provided, in 
pertinent part: 
1. That the Plaintiff Woodruff 
Ashton and the Defendant Wilford 
Ashton are brothers, and the Defen-
dant Virginia M. Ashton is the wife 
, of the Defendant Wilford Ashton .... 
2o That the Plaintiff and the Defe-
ndant Wilford Ashton had a brother 
known under the name and style of 
Frank Ashton, which brother is now 
deceased, having passed away some 
fourteen years prior hereto. 
3. That prior to the death of said 
Frank Ashton he was the owner of 
the following described real property 
and water rights located in and or 
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